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In this paper we provide a result that shows existence and uniqueness of Nash
equilibrium in cases in which existent methods are problematic to apply. We em-
ploy this result to the model with simple logit demand, and show existence and
uniqueness of price equilibrium when rms produce multiple non-symmetric prod-
ucts. Our proof for this case is based only on the intuitive assumption that market
shares are decreasing in own price.
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1 Introduction
Price equilibrium models with di¤erentiated products have received much attention
recently especially in the empirical industrial organization literature. Important
examples of this literature are the works by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995),
Feenstra and Levinsohn (1995) and Nevo (2001). The models in these studies use
pricing assumptions in order to estimate the model parameters. Existence of price
equilibrium is a necessary condition for the identication of the parameters. Unique-
ness of price equilibrium is important from a practical point of view since it is a
requirement for applying the structural empirical approach for policy analysis via
simulation estimators. Uniqueness of equilibrium is also useful for e¢ cient estima-
tion because it is a necessary condition for constructing the e¢ cient instruments
(Sándor, 2001, Berry, Linton and Pakes, 2003).
Existence and uniqueness of price equilibrium is also important from a theo-
retical point of view. Caplin and Nalebu¤ (1991) establish price equilibrium ex-
istence results for rather general model specications and uniqueness results for
some particular cases. Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992) provide a review of
equilibrium results for models with logit demand. Peitz (2000) extends the results
of Caplin and Nalebu¤ (1991) to cases that can be viewed as more realistic, like
utility maximization with a budget constraint or boundedly rational consumers.
Mizuno (2003) extends the uniqueness results of Caplin and Nalebu¤ (1991). All
these studies assume that rms produce one product and their approaches cannot be
easily generalized to multi-product rms. Anderson and de Palma (1992) consider
multi-product rms and show the existence and uniqueness of price equilibrium in
a model with nested logit demand and symmetric products. This latter feature
makes this result so specic that it cannot be generalized to a model with realistic
non-symmetric products. Another way to deal with multi-product rms is shown
by Milgrom and Roberts (1990), who study supermodular and log-supermodular
games. However, the pricing games involved in empirically relevant models do not
necessarily satisfy these properties.
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In this paper we provide a result that can serve as a tool for showing exis-
tence and uniqueness of price equilibrium in some cases in which the approaches
mentioned above cannot. This is the topic of the next section. We apply this
result to a simple version of the models from Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995)
and Nevo (2001), the model with simple logit demand, and show existence and
uniqueness of price equilibrium when rms produce multiple products without the
symmetry property. The simple logit demand model, although empirically less rel-
evant since it generates restrictive substitution patterns, is often used to illustrate
various estimation features (e.g., Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995) and in Monte
Carlo simulations (e.g., Berry, Linton and Pakes, 2003). In spite of the fact that
it is known as a well-behaved model, no proof of existence and uniqueness of price
equilibrium has been established in the literature. For example, Berry, Linton and
Pakes (2003, p.15) mention that price equilibrium for the simple logit is known to
be unique only when each product is owned by a di¤erent rm. We present the
proof of existence and uniqueness in section 3, and we make some nal remarks in
section 4.
2 An equilibrium result
In this section we briey discuss the available theoretical results regarding existence
and uniqueness of price equilibrium, and then present our result. The classical
approach for showing existence is based on the result according to which games
with convex and compact strategy sets and quasi-concave pay-o¤ functions have a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium is obtained as the xed point
of the best reply by applying the Brouwer or Kakutani xed point theorem. This
approach is taken by Caplin and Nalebu¤ (1991), who use results on generalized
concavity of probabilities to prove that the prot functions are quasi-concave. For
multi-product rms quasi-concavity of the prot functions is di¢ cult to verify with
this method, while a direct proof is typically hard to obtain.
An essentially di¤erent approach is supermodularity. Supermodularity of games
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was applied by Milgrom and Roberts (1990) to a number of equilibrium problems.
These authors establish among others that with one-product rms the pricing game
corresponding to the model with simple logit demand is log-supermodular and there-
fore has a unique price equilibrium. Supermodularity or log-supermodularity, as
they show, guarantees the existence of equilibrium also in games where the strategy
sets are multi-dimensional, but it appears that in general the pricing games arising
from the empirical models of interest do not satisfy these properties. An example
underpinning this statement is the model with simple logit demand, as we show in
Appendix B.
Uniqueness of the price equilibrium is typically established by proving that the
second derivative of the prot function has the dominant diagonal property. This
condition, however, appears to be too strong for the models that we consider, and
therefore we use a more general approach. For a detailed exposition of methods for
proving Nash equilibrium existence and uniqueness we refer to Vives (1999).
Our approach is di¤erent from those discussed above in that we consider the
price equilibrium as the solution of the rst order conditions of prot maximization
and not as the xed point of the best reply function (or correspondence). Hence
we establish that the rst order conditions have a solution and show that any such
solution is a Nash equilibrium of the game. For this we show that a players strategy
corresponding to a solution is the best reply to the other playersstrategies corre-
sponding to this solution. Uniqueness follows from the uniqueness of the solution
to the rst order conditions.
We turn now to the formal exposition. Assume a game with a nite number
of players denoted f = 1; :::; F whose strategies are multi-dimensional real convex
compact sets Df . Let f : D ! R denote their continuously di¤erentiable prot
functions, where D = D1  :::  DF . We use the common notation that v j is
the vector v without its jth component, v f is the part of vector v without the
components corresponding to the vector vf . By the notation of multi-dimensional
intervals that are open on one side we mean [a;b)  [a1; b1)  :::  [an; bn) where
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a = (a1; :::; an)
0 and b = (b1; :::; bn)
0. Vectors are by default column vectors, and, in
order to avoid confusion, they are denoted by boldface letters.
The result on which our equilibrium existence and uniqueness is based is the
following.
Proposition 1 Consider a game for which there is a strategy p that satises the
conditions:
1. For any f 2 f1; :::; Fg @f (p
)
@pf
= 0.
2. For any f 2 f1; :::; Fg there is exactly one pf for which
@f
 
pf ;p

 f

@pf
= 0.
3. For any f 2 f1; :::; Fg, f
 
pf ;p

 f

has an interior global maximum with
respect to pf 2 Df .
Then p is a Nash equilibrium of the game. If, in addition, there is a unique p
satisfying condition 1, then it is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game.
Proof. In order for p to be a Nash equilibrium it should satisfy thatf
 
pf ;p

 f
 
f
 
pf ;p

 f

for any pf 2 Df : By condition 3 there is a pf 2 Df that is an inte-
rior global maximum point of f
 ;p f. This satises @f  pf ;p f@pf = 0. By
condition 1 we know that
@f
 
pf ;p

 f

@pf
= 0 also holds. Then by 2 pf = p

f and
hence p satises f
 
pf ;p

 f
  f  pf ;p f, so it is a Nash equilibrium. Since
any Nash equilibrium of the game necessarily satises condition 1, the uniqueness
follows.
We note that conditions 2 and 3 of the proposition can be viewed as a generalization
of strict quasi-concavity of the prot function and they imply that there is a unique
best reply to the equilibrium strategies.
We introduce a function g whose xed points are exactly the solutions of the rst
order conditions of prot maximization, that is, g (p) = p if and only if
@f (p)
@pf
= 0
for any f 2 f1; :::; Fg. In order to demonstrate that conditions 1 and 2 of Lemma
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1 are satised we use a xed point uniqueness result, which is an implication of
Kelloggs (1976) result.
Lemma 2 (Kellogg, 1976) Let g : D ! D be a continuously di¤erentiable function
on a convex compact set D  Rn. If det

@g (p)
@p0
  In

6= 0 for any p 2 D; and g
has no xed points on the boundary of D then g has a unique xed point.
This result is used twice in the proof: once for existence and once for uniqueness.
Existence is based on the uniqueness of the prot maximizing solution. In order to
show that condition 3 holds we use the next result, proved in Appendix A.
Lemma 3 Assume that the prot function f of rm f is dened on the interval
[c;H], and there exists a vector pf 2 (cf ;Hf ) such that for any j 2 Gf , any
pj 2

pj; Hj

and any p j 2 [c j;H j] we have
@f
@pj
(pj;p j) < 0 and
@f
@pj
(cj;p j) > 0: (1)
Then for any pf =2
 
cf ;pf

and for any p f 2 [c f ;H f ] there is a epf 2  cf ;pf
such that
f (epf ;p f ) > f (pf ;p f ) : (2)
An implication of this lemma is that a prot function which satises these con-
ditions has interior global maximum. The lemma, in words, states that if such
a prot function is decreasing in the prices of the rm beyond a certain bound
and increasing at the marginal cost values, then the global maximum of the prot
function is attained at points that are kept between some bounds. These bounds
prevent the prot function from having a global maximum on the boundary of its
denition domain.
3 The simple logit case
Suppose that there are J products in the market denoted 1; :::; J . For j 2 f1; :::; Jg,
let dj and pj denote the characteristics and the price of product j; respectively. The
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utility of an individual i who purchases product j is
uij =  pj + dj + "ij;
ui0 = "i0;
where  is a scalar parameter, "ij is an iid type I extreme value random variable,
and product 0 represents the alternative when no product is purchased. In empirical
studies dj is typically taken as a linear function of several characteristics of product
j. The probability that product j is purchased, which we regard as the market
share of product j, is
sj =
exp ( pj + dj)
1 +
PJ
r=1 exp ( pr + dr)
:
Due to the simplicity of this formula the simple logit model is often used for illus-
trating various issues regarding discrete choice. From an empirical point of view
it is well known that its applicability is limited due to the restrictive substitution
patterns that it generates.
Suppose further that the J products are produced by F rms and each rm
f 2 f1; :::; Fg sells a subset Gf of the J products. The prot of rm f is
f =
X
j2Gf
(pj   cj)sj;
where cj denotes the constant marginal cost of producing product j. The rst
order conditions for prot maximization are equivalent to the system of equations
in p = (p1; :::; pJ)
0
pf   cf = 1

f
1  s0f f
for f = 1; :::; F; (3)
where pf , cf and sf are the price, marginal cost and market share vectors corre-
sponding to the products of rm f , and f is the vector of ones with jGf j number
of elements. This system of equations implies that the function g whose xed
points are the solutions of the rst order conditions of prot maximization should
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be dened as
gf (p) = cf +
1

f
1  s0f f
for f = 1; :::; F; and (4)
g (p) =
 
g1 (p)
0 ; :::;gF (p)
00 :
Below we show that this pricing game has a unique Nash equilibrium. The only
necessary assumption is the intuitive  > 0. The proof of the nal result relies on
Proposition 1.
First we show the existence of a J-dimensional compact interval that g trans-
forms into itself. Then we verify that g satises the conditions of Lemma 2. This
way we show that conditions 1 and 2 of Proposition 1 hold. Finally we show that
the conditions of Lemma 3 are satised, which on its turn implies condition 3 of
Proposition 1.
We start by demonstrating the conditions of Lemma 2. The function g from (4)
has the components
gj (p) = cj +
1

1
1  s0f f
for any f and j 2 Gf :
We dene
Bj  cj + 1

1
s0 (c)
for any j 2 f1; :::; Jg ;
where s0 (c) is the probability of the no-purchase alternative computed for p = c.
The following result (proved in Appendix A) shows that there is a compact interval
which is transformed by g into itself, and there is no xed point of g on the boundary
of this interval.
Proposition 4 For any p 2 [c1;1) ::: [cJ ;1) gj (p) satises
cj < gj (p) < Bj:
Next we establish the nonsingularity of the Jacobian of g minus the identity
matrix. This then completes the proof of the conditions of Lemma 2.
Proposition 5 The function g is continuously di¤erentiable on RJ and for any
p 2 RJ
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1. det
 
@gf (p)
@p0f
  If
!
6= 0 for any rm f ,
2. det

@g (p)
@p0
  IJ

6= 0. (Proved in Appendix A.)
Finally, we prove that the conditions of Lemma 3 are satised.
Proposition 6 For any rm f and any j 2 Gf there exists a pj > cj such that
@f
@pj
(pj;p j) < 0 and
@f
@pj
(cj;p j) > 0
for any pj  pj and p j  c j.
Proof. The derivative of f with respect to pj can be written as
@f (p)
@pj
= sj (1   (pj   cj) + f (p)) : (5)
First we note that the prot f (p) is bounded in p. This can be seen from
f (p) =
X
j2Gf
(pj   cj) exp ( pj + dj)
1 +
PJ
r=1 exp ( pr + dr)

X
j2Gf
(pj   cj) exp ( pj + dj)
for pj  cj and the fact that exp
  pj + x0j + j (pj   cj) !
pj!1
0 because  > 0.
Then it follows that for large pj the right hand side of the inequality below is
negative:
@f (p)
@pj
< 1   (pj   cj) +  supf (p) :
This implies the existence of pj with the announced property.
The second inequality from the statement of the proposition follows directly
from (5).
The nal result regarding the existence and uniqueness of price equilibrium is
contained in the following statement.
Theorem 7 In the simple logit model if  > 0 there exists a unique price equilib-
rium in [c1;1) ::: [cJ ;1).
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Proof. The proof is based on Proposition 1. For each j 2 f1; :::; Jg we dene
Kj such that
Kj  max

pj; Bj
	
: (6)
Let the prot function of rm f be dened on [cf ;Kf ]. Then Lemma 3 implies that
f (;p f ) : [cf ;Kf ] ! R has interior global maximum. So the prot functions
are dened on a convex compact set, are continuously di¤erentiable and satisfy
condition 3 of Lemma 1.
Proposition 4 implies that g (p) 2 (c;B)  [c;K] for any p 2 [c;K], and
therefore g does not have any xed point on the boundary of [c;K]. Together
with part (2) of Proposition 5 this implies that the conditions of Kelloggs xed
point theorem (Lemma 2) are satised and therefore g has a unique xed point.
This establishes condition 1 of Proposition 1 and the uniqueness of p satisfying
this condition. Condition 2 of this proposition follows by repeating the previous
arguments for gf
 ;p f applying now part (1) of Proposition 5.
So we have obtained that the conditions of Proposition 1 are satised. Hence
there is a unique price equilibrium in the set [c;K] : Since this statement is true for
any K with the property (6), it follows that there is exactly one price equilibrium
in the set [c1;1) ::: [cJ ;1).
4 Final remarks
We have presented a result that shows existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium
in some situations in which previously used results cannot. We applied this result
to the model with simple logit demand. Adopting realistic assumptions like multi-
product rms and non-symmetric products, we have shown that the pricing game
in this model has a unique Nash equilibrium. The only condition used in the proof
is that market shares of products are decreasing in own price.
In the proofs of both existence and uniqueness of price equilibrium we employed
Kelloggs (1976) xed point theorem. There is a connection between this approach
and the so-called global univalence approach of Gale and Nikaido (1965). It turns
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out that application of the former comes down to verifying conditions similar to the
case when we apply the latter. We refer to Vives (1999, p.47-48) for more details
on the latter approach.
The simple logit model is among the simplest models of discrete choice demand.
Yet we could not apply the methods established in the literature for proving the
existence of price equilibrium in the multi-product case. This is because, on the one
hand, the pricing game implied is not (log-)supermodular, and on the other hand,
due to multi-dimensionality of the prot functions, their quasi-concavity appears
di¢ cult to judge. This remains to be an interesting puzzle.
Continuing the remarks on the complexity of our proof, we mention that a pow-
erful tool used extensively to prove uniqueness in general equilibrium problems, is
the so-called index theory (see, e.g., Mas-Colell, 1985 for a fairly detailed presen-
tation). This theory can also be applied in the framework of the present paper,
and it o¤ers a more general approach. But in spite of the generalization o¤ered,
this approach does not signicantly simplify the proof. Neither does the additional
observation that the Hessians of the prot functions evaluated at the solutions to
the rst order conditions are negative denite (because they are diagonal matrices
with negative diagonal elements; see equation (11) in Appendix B). From index
theory it follows that the rst order conditions have a unique interior solution, but
it is not possible to avoid the proof that the prots have interior global maximum
points.
Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 3. Take an arbitrary pf =2
 
cf ;pf

. For any j 2 Gf dene epf
by its components
epj =
8<:
pj; if pj > pj
cj + "j; if pj = cj
pj; otherwise,
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where "j > 0 will be specied below. Denote the products of rm f by f1; f2; :::; fL.
Then we can show that
f (epf1; :::; epfL;p f )  f (pf1; epf2; :::; epfL;p f )
 f (pf1; pf2; epf3; :::; epfL;p f ) (7)
 :::  f (pf1; :::; pfL;p f )
step by step using (1). For example, we can show that the rst inequality holds by
treating the di¤erent cases for pf1 separately. If pf1 2
 
cf1; pf1

then epf1 = pf1,
so there is nothing to prove. If pf1 > pf1 then by the rst inequality from (1)
we have that f (; ep f1;p f ) is strictly decreasing and hence f (epf1; ep f1;p f ) =
f
 
pf1; ep f1;p f > f (pf1; ep f1;p f ). If pf1 = cf1 then by the second inequality
from (1) f (; ep f1;p f ) is strictly increasing and therefore there is a small "f1 > 0
for which epf1 = cf1 + "f1 satises
f (epf1; ep f1;p f ) > f (cf1; ep f1;p f ) = f (pf1; ep f1;p f ) :
For showing the other steps of inequality (7) we proceed similarly. The strict in-
equality from (2) is implied by the fact that if pf =2
 
cf ;pf

then at least one
component of pf ; say j; satises that pj =2
 
cj; pj

.
Lemma 8 Let M be an F F non-singular matrix,  a scalar and u and v column
vectors of size F . Then
det (M   uv0) =  1  v0M 1u detM;
and hence the matrix M   uv0 is non-singular if and only if 1  v0M 1u 6= 0. If
this last non-equality holds, then
(M   uv0) 1 =M 1 + 
1  v0M 1uM
 1uv0M 1:
(For a proof we refer to Dhrymes, 1984, p.40.)
Proof of Proposition 4. The rst part of the inequality is obvious. For
the second part, because the probabilities of all alternatives sum to one, and s0 is
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increasing in p, we have
gj (p) = cj +
1

1
s0 (p) +
P
r=2Gf sr (p)
< cj +
1

1
s0 (p)
 cj + 1

1
s0 (c)
:
Proof of Proposition 5. The partial derivatives of the components of g
corresponding to a rm f have the expressions
@gj
@ph
=   sh
1  s0f f
for j; h 2 Gf ; and
@gj
@pk
=
sk
1  s0f f
s0f f
1  s0f f
for j 2 Gf ; k =2 Gf :
These imply that the diagonal blocks of the derivatives matrix are
@gf
@p0f
=   1
1  s0f f
fs
0
f ; f = 1; :::; F:
Lemma 8 (fromAppendix A) implies that the matrix
@gf
@p0f
 If =  

If +
1
1 s0f f
fs
0
f

is non-singular if 1 +
s0f f
1 s0f f
6= 0, which is satised. This proves the rst statement
of the proposition.
For the second statement we compute the o¤-diagonal blocks of the derivatives
matrix, which are
@gf
@p0q
=
s0f f 
1  s0f f
2 qs0q; f; q = 1; :::; F; f 6= q:
To simplify the involved expressions we introduce the notation:
f 
s0f f 
1  s0f f
2 and  f  1 
1  s0f f
2 ; for f = 1; :::; F:
We can write
@g
@p0
  IJ in the form
@g
@p0
  IJ =
264 11...
F F
375
264 s1...
sF
375
0
 
264  11s
0
1 + I1    0
...
. . .
...
0     F F s0F + IF
375 ; (8)
where the matrix on the right hand side is block-diagonal. A diagonal block of this
matrix  f fs
0
f + If is invertible if 1 +  fs
0
f f 6= 0 for any p 2 RJ (Lemma 8). This
property is clearly satised. Then its inverse is 
 f fs
0
f + If
 1
= If  
 f
1 +  fs
0
f f
fs
0
f : (9)
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From (8) and Lemma 8 the matrix
@g
@p0
  IJ is non-singular if
1 
264 s1...
sF
375
0 264  11s
0
1 + I1    0
...
. . .
...
0     F F s0F + IF
375
 1 264 11...
F F
375 6= 0
for any p 2 RJ : Using the inverse (9), after some simple calculus this condition
becomes
1 
FX
f=1
f
1 + f
s0f f 6= 0 for any p 2 RJ :
Since
f
1 + f
< 1
FX
f=1
f
1 + f
s0f f <
FX
f=1
s0f f = 1  s0 < 1:
This implies that
1 
FX
f=1
f
1 + f
s0f f > 0 for any p 2 RJ
and hence
@g
@p0
  IJ is non-singular, that is, det

@g (p)
@p0
  IJ

6= 0 for any p 2 RJ .
Appendix B
Here we show that the pricing game implied by the standard logit case is neither
supermodular nor log-supermodular. The denition of supermodularity from Mil-
grom and Roberts (1990) implies that the pricing game in the case of the standard
logit is supermodular if the prot functions are twice continuously di¤erentiable
and for any p
@2f (p)
@pj@ph
 0 for any f and j; h 2 Gf ; j 6= h; and
@2f (p)
@pj@pk
 0 for any f and j 2 Gf ; k =2 Gf :
The pricing game is log-supermodular if the logarithms of the prot functions sat-
isfy the above criteria. We show that the rst inequality does not hold for the
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standard logit model. From Proposition 7 it follows that there is a unique price
equilibrium, p, and this solves the rst-order conditions for prot maximization,
that is,
@f (p
)
@pj
= 0 for any f and j 2 Gf . Equation (5) implies that
1    pj   cj+ f (p) = 0: (10)
The second order derivative of the prot function for j; h 2 Gf ; j 6= h is
@2f (p)
@pj@ph
=
@sj
@ph
(1   (pj   cj) + f (p)) + sj @f (p)
@ph
:
Computed at the equilibrium price, this is zero:
@2f (p
)
@pj@ph
= 0; (11)
due to (10) and
@f (p
)
@ph
= 0. We use this fact to show the following.
Proposition 9 For arbitrary j; h 2 Gf there exists a p arbitrarily close to p such
that
1.
@2f
 
p

@pj@ph
< 0 and
2.
@2 lnf
 
p

@pj@ph
< 0.
Proof. Take any " > 0 and dene p such that
p
j
= pj + "; ph = p

h + " and pr = p

r for all r 6= j; h:
Due to Theorem 7 pf is a unique global maximum of f
 ;p f. Thus for any
" > 0 we have f
 
p

< f (p
). We observe another way of writing the second
order derivatives:
@2f (p)
@pj@ph
= sjsh (2   (pj   cj)   (ph   ch) + 2f (p)) : (12)
Then (11) implies that
2    pj   cj   (ph   ch) + 2f (p) = 0:
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From the denition of p we have
2 

p
j
  cj

 

p
h
  ch

+2f
 
p

< 2   pj   cj  (ph   ch)+2f (p) = 0:
Together with (12) this implies statement 1 of the proposition.
For showing statement 2 we write
@2 lnf
 
p

@pj@ph
=
@2f
 
p

@pj@ph
f
 
p
  @f  p
@pj
@f
 
p

@ph 
f
 
p
2 : (13)
Because
1  

p
j
  cj

+ f
 
p

< 1    pj   cj+ f (p) = 0;
it follows from (5) that
@f
 
p

@pj
< 0, and similarly
@f
 
p

@ph
< 0. Thus
@f
 
p

@pj
@f
 
p

@ph
> 0;
and therefore the right hand side of (13) is negative, which completes the proof.
We note that because p is arbitrarily close to p we do not run the risk of
having p outside the strategy sets of the rms, so the result is robust in this sense.
Therefore we can safely claim that this pricing game is neither supermodular nor
log-supermodular.
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